Supreme Court Judgement on Yakub Memon case

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.135 OF 2015

Yakub Abdul Razak Memon ...               Petitioner

Versus

State of Maharashtra and Anr. ...    Respondents 

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

1.The issue that had seen the end after the day’s drill at 4.15 p.m. yesterday, i.e., 29.07.2015, appears to have unending character because precisely after ten hours, about 3.15 a.m. on 30.07.2015, it has risen like a phoenix possibly harbouring the idea that it has the potentiality to urge for a second lease of life as put forth by Mr. Anand Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Yug Chaudhry, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, stating that the assail has become inevitable after the President of India in exercise of his power under Article 72 of the Constitution has rejected the mercy petition preferred by the petitioner.Be it stated,it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by virtue of the rejection of the mercy petition, the death warrant issued on 30.4.2015 would be executed today, without waiting for 14 days, and hence, there should be a grant of stay.

2. We may mention that, before the ink in the earlier judgment has dried up, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the legal justifiability of the execution warrant dated 30.04.2015 issued by the Presiding officer, Designated TADA Court, Mumbai, for execution of the petitioner at 7.00 a.m. on 30.07.2015 and further to direct the stay of the petitioner’s execution till the instant writ petition is disposed of.

3.We do not have to adumbrate the facts in entirety as the facts of the instant case have been elaborately stated in W.P. (Crl.) No. 129 of 2015 which has been dismissed on 29.07.2015. In the earlier writ petition, the prayer, in quintessentiality, was made for setting aside the death warrant issued by the Designated TADA Court, Mumbai. The grounds were many but we must state with certitude that they did not find favour with us. Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel would submit that it might appear that the prayers in the present petition are the same and anyone may foster the idea that an effort has been made in a contrived manner to procrastinate the date of execution of the convict, but it is not so. He would further submit that by the occurrence of subsequent events that took place after the pronouncement of the judgment, fresh grounds have emerged which could not have been conceived of at the time when the matter was argued.It is urged that though the prayer is the same, yet the grounds are totally different.

4. At this juncture, the subsequent event which has been accentuated upon by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel, needs to be noted. After we dismissed the earlier writ petition being W.P.(Crl) No. 129 of 2015, the President of India rejected the mercy petition of the petitioner. The fulcrum of the submission of Mr. Grover is that the petitioner is entitled in law to challenge the same albeit on a limited ground and, therefore, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr. V. Union of India & ors. (2014) 3 SCC  has, upon perusal of various jail manuals which exhibited 1 discrepancies, intended to rationalise by laying down a minimum period so that the convict can make certain arrangements. To put it succinctly, when a mercy petition is rejected, there has to be a minimum period of 14 days between its rejection being communicated to the petitioner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. That apart, minimum period of 14 days is stipulated between the communication of the death warrant to the petitioner and the scheduled date of execution.

5. Mr. Grover, learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would contend that both the conditions are to be satisfied as they are cumulative in nature. There can be no cavil over the same. First, to the second condition. The death warrant was issued on 30.04.2015 which was admittedly received by the petitioner on 13.07.2015 and the date of its execution is 30.07.2015, i.e., today. Thus, one of the facets is met with. As far as the first aspect is concerned, in the earlier judgment passed in W.P.(Crl) No. 129/2015, this Court has held thus:- “After the judgment was pronounced on 21.03.2013,an application for review was filed, which was dismissed by circulation on 30.07.2013. After the rejection of the application for review, Suleman, the brother of the petitioner, represented under Article 72 of the Constitution to the President of India on 06.08.2013, claiming benefits under Article 72(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner on 07.08.2013, wrote to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Nagpur, informing him about receipt of petition by the office of the President of India. On 02.09.2013, the Government of India forwarded the mercy petition of the convict addressed to the President of India, to the

Principal Secretary, Home Department, Mahrashtra,as per the procedure. The Governor of Maharashtra rejected representation on 14.11.2013 and on 30.09.2013, the State Government informed the Central Government about rejection of the mercy petition by the governor of Maharashtra. On receipt of the said communication from the State Government on 10.03.2014, the summary of the case/mercy petition prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the signatures of Home Minister was forwarded to the Petitioner. The said rejection was communicated to the stipulation that the convict be informed and, accordingly, on 26.05.2014, the petitioner was informed about the rejection of mercy petition by the President of India.” We have reproduced the whole paragraph as they state the facts in completeness. Before we proceed with regard to the necessity for grant of 14 days’ time after receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition, it is appropriate to refer to paragraph 241.7 of the Shatrughan Chauhan’s case (supra) which reads as follows:- “241.7. Some Prison Manuals do not provide for any minimum period between the rejection of the mercy petition being communicated to the prisoner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. Some Prison Manulas have a minimum period of 1 day, others have a minimum period of 14 days. It is necessary that a minimum period of 14 days be stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution for the following reasons: (a) It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for execution, to make his peace with God, prepare his will and settle other earthly affairs.(b) It allows the prisoner to have a last and final meeting with his family members. It also allows the prisoners’ family members to make arrangements to travel to the prison which may be located at a distant place and meet the prisoner for the last time.Without sufficient notice of the scheduled date of execution, the prisoners’ right to avail of judicial remedies will be thwarted and they will be prevented from having a last and final meeting with their families.”It is urged by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel that the first mercy petition was submitted by Suleman, brother of the petitioner, on 06.08.2013 which stood rejected on 11.04.2014 by the President of India and that was communicated to the petitioner on 26.05.2014, but the petitioner had not submitted any mercy petition.

6.There is no dispute over the fact that the petitioner had not submitted any representation invoking the authority of the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India. However, it is not in dispute that his brother had submitted. It is also beyond dispute that the petitioner does not disown the submission of the petition by his brother on his behalf. In fact,he had communicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail,Nagpur, on 07.08.2013, informing him about receipt of the petition by the office of the President of India so as to pursue the same. The said mercy petition as has been indicated earlier stood rejected on 11.04.2014.The petitioner did not think it appropriate to challenge the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India. He accepted his fate.

7. Be it stated here, the mercy petition was preferred on 6.08.2013 and prior to that, the review petition was dismissed by circulation on 30.07.2013 by the two-Judge Bench of this Court which had decided the appeal on 21.03.2013. As is evident, the constitutional validity of the rule relating to review was called in question before this Court. The Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Ors.2 dealing with the said rule opined that in death cases, the matter should be heard by a three-Judge Bench and the review petition should be heard in the open court by giving maximum time limit of 30 minutes to the convict.

8. Since the petitioner had not filed a curative petition, he was entitled to seek reopening of the review petition, as per the 2 (2014) 9 SCC 737 liberty granted to certain categories of cases in Mohd. Arif Alias Ashfaq (supra). Accordingly, his review petition was heard by a three-Judge Bench in the open Court. After rejection of the said review petition on 09.04.2015, he filed a curative petition on 22.05.2015 which also got dismissed on 21.07.2015. At this stage, it is imperative to state that despite the Constitution Bench saying that there shall be oral hearing of the application for review for a maximum period of 30 minutes, the review petition was heard for almost ten days. The purpose of mentioning the same is that ample opportunity was afforded to the petitioner.

9. After rejection of the curative petition on the 21.07.2015, the petitioner submitted a mercy petition to the Governor, Maharashtra which was received on 22.07.2015. He also submitted another mercy petition to the President of India which was received by the President of India at 2.00 p.m. on 29.07.2015. Both these mercy petitions have been rejected.

10. It is submitted by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel, that as per the principle stated in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), the petitioner is entitled to claim commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment on the basis of supervening circumstances. For the said purpose, he has referred to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the decision in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) which read as under:- “28. The petitioners herein have asserted the following events as the supervening circumstances, for communication of death sentence to life imprisonment: (i) Delay (ii) Insanity (iii)Solitary confinement (iv)Judgments declared per incuriam(v) Procedural laspses . All the petitioners have more or less asserted on the aforesaid grounds which, in their opinion, the executive had failed to take note of while rejecting the mercy petitions filed by them. Let us discuss them distinctively and come to a conclusion whether each of the circumstances exclusively or together warrants the communication of death sentence into life imprisonment.”

What is submitted today is that the petitioner can challenge the rejection of the mercy petition only when it is formally served on him, for the counsel for the petitioner have only come to know from the news report about the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India. Thus, 14 days’ time has not been granted and he has been deprived of the right to assail the same. As has been stated earlier, the said stand has been sought to be highlighted on the basis of the reasons stated in paragraph 241.7 of the case of Shatrughan Chauhan (supra). Pyramiding the said submission, it is propounded by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel that in the absence of any time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition, the execution of death warrant deserves to be stayed.

11. The question that emerges for consideration is whether on the ground of not granting of 14 days’ time from the date of receipt of communication of rejection of the mercy petition, should the warrant which is going to be executed at 7.00 a.m. on 30.07.2015 be stayed. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India, appearing for the respondent, would submit that the mercy petition is considered by the President of India in exercise of his power under Article 72 of the Constitution of India and when he has rejected the mercy petition after due consideration of all the relevant facts on earlier occasion, if such kind of repetitive mercy petitions are allowed to be submitted and further challenge to the rejection of the same is permitted, the danger of the concept of ad infinitum would enter into the field. Mr. Rohatgi would further contend that at the drop of a hat, everybody can add a new fact or a new development and expect the President of India to deal with it as contemplated under Article 72 of the Constitution of India and, thereafter, challenge the same in a court of law.

12. The instant petition is a clear expose of the manipulation of the principle of rule of law. The petitioner was tried for which is known as “Bombay Blast Case’ and stood convicted in the year 2007. Almost 22 years have passed since 1993 when the incident occurred. We have not perceived any error in the issue of the death warrant as per our order dated 29.07.2015 passed in W.P. (Crl) No.129 of 2015. The only exception which has been enthusiastically carved out by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel is that they are entitled to get 14 days’ time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition. When the first mercy petition was rejected on 11.04.2014, there was sufficient time available to the petitioner

to make arrangement for his family members to meet him in prison and make necessary worldly arrangements. There was adequate time to prepare himself to meet his Maker and to make peace with himself. We have been apprised by Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India that the family was allowed to meet the petitioner whenever they desired as per the Jail Manual.

13. The residuary part of the submissions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner can still challenge the rejection of his mercy petition. On a first glance, the aforesaid submission may look quite attractive, but in the present case the same does not have much commendation because the rejection of the first mercy petition by the President of India could have been assailed before this Court, but it was

not done. We have been apprised that the copy of the order of rejection of the mercy petition has been sent to the petitioner, but the fact remains that after the rejection of the first mercy petition, despite sufficient time, the petitioner chose not to challenge the same. We do not think that it is a case of such nature where it can be said that legal remedy was denied to the petitioner. True it is, the first mercy petition was submitted by the brother of the petitioner, but as the facts would clearly show, he was aware of the same. Learned Attorney General would contend that the petitioner, in fact, had written a letter to the concerned Superintendent of Jail pertaining to the same. Regard being had to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to accept the submission that the present mercy petition was preferred by the petitioner for the first time and, therefore, 14 days’ time should be granted so that he can do the needful as per law. In our considered opinion, to grant him further time to challenge the rejection of the second mercy petition for which we have to stay the execution of the death warrant dated 30.04.2015 would be nothing but travesty of justice.

14.Resultantly,we do not perceive any merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

J.[Dipak Misra]

J.[Prafulla C. Pant]

J. [Amitava Roy]

New Delhi

July 30, 2015

Courtesy : Supreme Court of India website 

Unwed Mother Can Be Sole Guardian With out Consent Of Father

 Unwed mother can be sole guardian without consent of father

 Key Points in the progressive Judgement of Apex Court :

• On the crucial issue of guardianship of child by unwed mother without consent of father,this judgement solves the problem[embarrassing]of unwed mother,who don't want to disclose the name of the father for various reasons eg.Right to privacy.
• In this case ,an application under Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (the Act)was before the Guardian Court for declaring her the sole guardian of her son.
• Mother refused to disclose the name of the father and his whereabouts,it is also pressed to the fore that her own fundamental right to privacy will be violated if she is compelled to disclose the name and particulars of the father of her child.
• Paper notification was issued to the effect,father name was not revealed.
• The Guardian Court directed her to reveal the name and whereabouts of the father and consequent to her refusal to do so, dismissed her guardianship application on 19.4.2011
• The Court are supposed to exercise  paren patrae jurisdiction in custody or guardianship wrangles; it steps in to secure the welfare of the hapless child of two adults whose personal differences and animosity has taken precedence over the future of their child.
• This is a brooding reality as the father is already married and any publicity as to a declaration of his fathering a child out of wedlock would have pernicious repercussions to his present family. There would be severe social complications for her and her child. As per Section 7 of the Act, the interest of the minor is the only relevant factor for appointing of a guardian, and the rights of the mother and father are subservient thereto.  
• Supreme Court held that : In this scenario, the interest of the child would be best served by immediately appointing the Appellant as the guardian.

Full Text of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India Judgement :

IN THE SUPRME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ........ OF 2015

[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 28367 of 2011]

ABC                                             ... Appellant

Versus

The State (NCT of Delhi)            ... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

Leave granted.

A legal nodus of seminal significance and of prosaic  procedural origination presents itself before us. The conundrum is whether it is imperative for an unwed mother to specifically notify the putative father of the child whom she has given birth to of her petition for appointment as the guardian of her child.The common perception would be that three competing legal interests would arise,namely,of the mother and the father and the child.We think that it is only the last one which is conclusive, since the parents in actuality have only legal obligations. A child, as has been ubiquitously articulated in different legal forums,is not a chattel or a ball to be shuttled or shunted from one parent to the other.The  Court exercises  paren patrae jurisdiction in custody or guardianship wrangles; it steps in to secure the welfare of the hapless child of two adults whose personal differences and animosity has taken precedence over the future of their child.

 This Appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 8.8.2011 delivered by the High Court of Delhi, which has dismissed the First Appeal of the Appellant,who is an unwed mother, holding that her guardianship application cannot be entertained unless she discloses the name and address of the father of her child, thereby enabling the Court to issue process to him. As per the Appellant’s request, her identity and personal details as well as those of her son have not been revealed herein.The Appellant, who adheres to the Christian faith, is well educated, gainfully employed and financially secure. She gave birth to her son in 2010, and has subsequently raised him without any assistance from or involvement of his putative father. Desirous of making her son her nominee in all her savings and other insurance policies, she took steps in this direction, but was informed that she must either declare the name of the father or get a guardianship/adoption certificate from the Court. She thereupon filed an application under Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (the Act)before the Guardian Court for declaring her the sole guardian of her son. Section 11 of the Act requires a notice to be sent to the parents of the child before a guardian is appointed. The Appellant has published a notice of the petition in a daily newspaper, namely Vir Arjun, Delhi Edition but is strongly averse to naming the father. She has filed an affidavit stating that if at any time in the future the father of her son raises any objections regarding his guardianship, the same may be revoked or altered as the situation may require.However, the Guardian Court directed her to reveal the name and whereabouts of the father and consequent to her refusal to do so, dismissed her guardianship application on 19.4.2011. The Appellant’s appeal before the High Court was dismissed  in limine , on the reasoning that her allegation that she is a single mother could only be decided after notice is issued to the father; that a natural father could have an interest in the welfare and custody  of his child even if there is no marriage; and that no case can be decided in the absence of a necessary party.Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, has vehemently argued before us that the Appellant does not want the future of her child to be marred by any controversy regarding his paternity, which would indubitably result should the father refuse to acknowledge the child as his own.

This is a brooding reality as the father is already married and any publicity as to a declaration of his fathering a child out of wedlock would have pernicious repercussions to his present family. There would be severe social complications for her and her child. As per Section 7 of the Act, the interest of the minor is the only relevant factor for appointing of a guardian, and the rights of the mother and father are subservient thereto. In this scenario, the interest of the child would be best served by immediately appointing the Appellant as the guardian.

Furthermore, it is also pressed to the fore that her own fundamental right to privacy will be violated if she is compelled to disclose the name and particulars of the father of her child. Ms. Malhotra has painstakingly argued this Appeal, fully cognizant that the question that arises is of far reaching dimensions. It is this very feature that convinced us of the expediency of appointing amicus curiae , and Mr. Sidharth Luthra has discharged these onerous duties zealously, for which we must immediately record our indebtedness.It would be pertinent to succinctly consider the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Act, which applies to Christians in India, lays down the procedure by which guardians are to be appointed by the Jurisdictional Court. Sections 7, 11and 19 deserve extraction, for facility of reference. Power of the court to make order as to guardianship

(1) Where the court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor that an order should be made-

(a) appointing a guardian of his person or property, or both,

or

(b) declaring a person to be such a guardian, the court may make an order accordingly.

(2) An order under this section shall imply the removal of any guardian who has not been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the court.

(3) Where a guardian has been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the court, an order under this section appointing or declaring another person to be guardian in his stead shall not be made until the powers of the guardian appointed or declared as aforesaid have ceased under the provisions of this Act.”

Courtesy : Supreme Court of India website  

Supreme Court of India on Out of Court settlement -Section 320 and 482 Cr.PC

Supreme Court of India  on "Out of Court settlement or compromise "-Application of Section 320 and 482 of Cr.PC : 

Hon'ble Supreme Court order in State of M.P  vs Manish& Ors  upholding Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 and.P. v. Deepak and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 285 on out of court settlement ,application of Section 320 for compounding of offences and Section 482 for quashing of criminal cases in case of out of court settlement.  

                                            

What type of criminal cases can be settled "out of court" or " Compromise"  ?

The Hon'ble Supreme Court said "only criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes"

When crimnal cases are quashed ?What case can be quashed ?

The Hon'ble Supreme Court said criminal cases [FIR] can be quashed under below circumstances :

(i) to secure the ends of justice or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. 

Power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed ,however ,Apex Court Said"Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute."

 Full Text of  Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgement date 6th July 2015 in the case of State of M.P  vs Manish& Ors

   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 860 OF 2015

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.1059/2014)

                              

 STATE OF M.P                                             Appellant

VERSUS 

MANISH & ORS                                                Respondent(s)

 

O R D E R

Leave granted.

Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents.

The appellant/State of Madhya Pradesh seeks to challenge the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 25.6.2013 passed in Misc. Criminal Case No.4013/2013, in and by which the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by taking into account the stand of the de facto complainant, who was present before the Court, that she did not wish to prosecute the respondents herein as the disputes have been amicably settled between them, curiously proceeded to quash the FIR in Crime No.512/2012 registered at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior for offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC as well as the subsequent criminal proceedings being Criminal Case No.2602/2013 for the same offences pending before the Court. The High Court, however, made it clear that the proceedings pending against the private respondents herein in relation to the offences under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act were not quashed by the Court. Therefore, the moot question that arises for consideration is whether based on out of Court settlement alleged to have been reached between the private parties, the offences of this nature falling under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC which are not covered by Section 320 Cr.P.C. can be taken note of and such orders of quashing of the proceedings can be passed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The question is no longer res integra, in asmuch as the Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 which has been subsequently followed in a number of other decisions including the recent decision in State of M.P. v. Deepak and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 285, clearly sets out as to in what circumstances and in what type of cases such exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked de hors Section 320 Cr.P.C. for recognizing such out of Court settlement for the purpose of quashing of criminal proceedings.

The Three-Judge Bench decision in Gian Singh (supra) is an illuminating judgment on this issue. In paragraph 61 ultimately the position has been set out in clear terms as under:-“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamont to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis added) When we apply the principles set down therein, it can be stated that when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. Inasmuch as such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large, it runs beyond our comprehension to state that after the commission of such offence the parties involved have reached a settlement and, therefore, such settlement can be given a seal of approval by the Judicial Forum.In the circumstances, the High Court unfortunately having failed to appreciate the said legal position, the impugned order cannot be sustained. We are, therefore, convinced that in a situation where the private respondents herein are facing trial for offences under Sections 307, 294 read with 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, the cases pending trial before the Court in Criminal Case No.2602 of 2013, as the offences are definitely as against the society, the private respondents will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.

The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law.With the above observations and directions, the appeal stands allowed

J.[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]  J.[UDAY UMESH LALIT]

NEW DELHI;JULY 06, 2015.
Courtesy  : Supreme Court of India website